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Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Supreme Court of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

RE:

NPCA v. State & Garfield County
Case No. 880022

Dear Mr* Butler:

Pursuant to Rule 2 4 ( j ) , Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, we
wish to advise the Court of three (3) cases which have been decided
since the briefs were filed in this case, and which are pertinent
and significant thereto:
1. Northern Plains v. Lujan, decided by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals on May 9, 1989, which is pertinent to the standing
arguments set forth in both Respondents 1 and Intervenor' s briefs.
2.
ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, et al., decided by the United
States Supreme Court on May 30, 1989, on appeal from the Arizona
case cited in Respondent's Brief at page 11.
3. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, decided
by the Utah ourt of Appeals on November 8, 1988, which is pertinent
to the jurisdiction arguments set forth in both Respondents 1 and
Intervenor's briefs.
Copies of these cases are enclosed for the consideration
of the Court.
Respectfully submitted,

-fafcArf. TfoL
PATRICK B. NOLAN
Garfield County Attorney
Attorney for Intervenor
M.'l > "\ '<v*l

NPCA v. State and Garfield County
Geoffrey J. Butler
June 15, 1989
Page 2

K^AUtU^^z.
DAVID S. CHRISTENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
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OHN S. MCALLISTER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
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Enclosures (3)
cc:

William J. Lockhart
Chris Wangsgard
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTOCIRCUIT
NORTHERN PLAINS RESOURCE
COUNCIL, MCCONE AGRICULTURAL
PROTECTION ORGANIZATION, and
MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION. ;SC

Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
MANUEL LUJAN, JR.,* SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
MERIDIAN MINERALS CO.,
BURUNGTON NORTHERN INC. and
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD C O

MM) ^B89

No. 87-4453
D.C. Nos.
85-115-BLG-JFB
85-150-BLG-JFB
OPINION

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court
District of Montana at Billings
James F. Battin, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
March 9, 1989
Filed May 9, 1989
Before: Eugene A. Wright and Arthur L. Alarcon, Circuit
Judges, and Dickran Tevrizian,** District Judge.
•Manuel Lujan, Jr., the current Secretar, of the Interior, is substituted in
for former Secretary of the Interior Donald P. Hodd pursuant to
F.R.App.P.R«k43(cXl).
••Honorable Dickran Tevrizian, United Sutes Distria Judge, Central
Distad of Califonua, utUot by detiguuoa.
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NORTHERN PLAINS V. LUJAN

Opinion by Judge Tevrizian

SUMMARY
Environmental Law/Jurisdiction

Affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of appellees and dismissal of the complaint in the
underlying action, the court held that an exchange of fee coal
interests complied with National Environmental Policy Act
requirements regarding adequate environmental impact
analyses and conformed with the existing land use plan.
Appellees Meridian Minerals and the United States
Department of the Interior exchanged fee coal interests in
McCone County, Montana. Prior to the exchange, each held
alternating sections of land and mineral interests which were
too small to mine feasibly. The exchange consolidated one
tract for Interior and one for Meridian. Interior's appraisal off
the exchange value showed that Interior received substantial
excess value over what it deeded to Meridian. Appellants
challenged the exchange alleging lack of compliance with
equal value, land use planning and National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) requirements.
[1| A district court reviews an environmental impact statement (EIS) under a rule of reason. If the EIS contains a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the
probable environmental consequences, a court may not hold
it insufficient on the basis of inconsequential, technical deficiencies, f2| The NEPA does not require a separate analysis of
alternatives with consequences indistinguishable from the
action proposed. [3| Interior complied with the NEPA
i although it did not produce a separate EIS addr^^^g nnly
' this exchange. J4]Appcllants have neither a cause of action
•/^nor standing to challenge Interior's grant of a land patent
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becauseappellantscannot assert anv legal property interest in ,
the land in issucjSj Since appellants do not have standing to"
challenge the equal value determination of Interior, the court
does not have jurisdiction. (6| Merely alleging injury to status
as a taxpayer does not confer standing because it does not
create an interest in favor of appellants distinguishable from
that of the general public. |7| Since appellants have not demonstrated the requisite injury to assert standing, their appeal
on these claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (8|
Interior reasonably interpreted the exchange to conform with
the federal land use plan and no amendment to the plan was
required by the exchange.
COUNSEL
James A. Patten, Billings, Montana, and David C. Masselli,
Arlington, Virginia, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Myles E. Flint, Fred R. Disheroon, Jacques B. Gelin, and
Dirk D. SneU Department of Justice, Washington, D.C:, for
the defendant-appellee Secretary of the Interior. Guy R. Martin, William A. Gould, Donald G Baur, Perkins, Coie, Washington D.C. for the defendants-appellees Burlington
Northern Inc. and Burlington Northern Railroad Co.
Steven P. Quarles, Thomas R. Lundquist, Crowell & Moring,
Washington, D.C, and Stephen H. Foster, Holland & Hart,
Billings, Montana, for the defendant-appellee Meridian Minerals Co.
OPINION
TEVRIZIAN, District Judge:
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants Northern Plains Resource Council, McCone
Agricultural Protection Organization, and Montana Wildlife
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Federation (collectively "NPRC") appeal from the decision
of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of
appellees Meridian Minerals Company, Burlington Northern
Inc., and Burlington Northern Railroad Company, et al.
("Companies") and Donald Hodel, Secretary of the Interior
("Interior"), and dismissing the complaint in the underlying
action. The underlying action is a challenge to an exchange of
fee coal interests ("exchange") between Meridian Minerals
Company ("Meridian") and the United States Department of
the Interior consolidating ownership in the Circle West coal
deposit in McCone County, Montana. The exchange was
completed in September 1983. The district court's opinion is
reported at 675 F.Supp. 1231 (D.Mont. 1987).
An action against the exchange was also filed by the
National Coal Association and the Mining and Reclamation
Council of America ("NCA/MRC"). The district court partially consolidated the two actions on the common issues
regarding the legality of the exchange under Section 206 of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 197^
("FLPMA") and the reasonableness of the public interest
determination made by the Department of the Interior as
required by the FLPMA. 675 F.Supp. at 1236. These are
claims 1 through 4 of the NPRC suit (85-150-BLG-JFB) and
claims 1 through 4 and 11 of the NCA/MARC suit
(85-115-BLG-JFB). The unconsolidated claims 5 through 11
concern compliance with equal value, land use planning and
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")
requirements. This appeal is brought only as to the unconsolidated claims.
Meridian proposed the Circle West exchange in November
1981. The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") cpnducted
a study of the proposal and released its environmental assessment in December 1982. After requesting and considering
written comments from the public, the BLM approved the
exchange in May 1983. On September 8, 1983, Interior
approved the BLM decision finding the fee interests appro-
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priate for exchange under Section 206 of the FLPMA, 43
U.S.C. section 1716. This approval constituted final agency
action by the Interior. 675 F.Supp. at 1234-35.
Prior to the exchange, Meridian and Interior held land and
mineral interests in alternating sections in a checkerboard
pattern created by the terms of 19th century land grants. Each
section is too small to support an independent and economically feasible coal mining operation. The exchange consolidates one tract for Interior and one for Meridian by
conveying to Interior all of Meridian's fee coal rights to the
southern half of the Circle West deposit, and conveying to
Meridian all of Interior's fee coal rights to the northern half
of the Circle West deposit. Interior now has the consolidated
southern tract for federal coal leasing, and Meridian now has
the consolidated northern tract for development or leasing.
675 F.Supp. at 1235. As a result of the exchange, Interior
received 11,553 acres of fee coal containing approximately
198.2 million tons of recoverable coal, and a one percen^royalty on the coal produced from Meridian's post-excfcfange
tract. Meridian received 7,887 acres of fee coal containing
approximately 159.9 million tons of recoverable coal. Interior's appraisal of the exchange value showed that Interior was
receiving $7,785 million in excess value (without the royalty)
or $13,278 million in excess value over what it deeded to
Meridian (with the royalty). 675 F.Supp. at 1235, 1245.
On appeal, appellants raise tlw following issues:
t. Whether Section 102(2XQ of the NEPA requires
preparation of a separate environmental impact
statement on the exchange, or whether a prior draft
and final environmental impact statement on federal regional coal leasing and an environmental
assessment pertaining to the exchange satisfies the
statutory requirement;
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2. Whether the exchange complied with the "equal
value" requirement of Section 206(b) of the
FLPMA; and
3. Whether Interior reasonably interpreted its
exchange regulations in finding that the exchange
conformed with the operative federal land use plan
without requiring BLM to amend the plan prior to
the exchange.
ii

DISCUSSION

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C
section 1331. This court's jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. section 1291. As will be explained below, neither the district
court nor this court has proper jurisdiction over plaintiffsappellants' equal value claims. Plaintiffs' appeal is timely,
having been filed on December 22, 1987, within 60 days of
judgment as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

4(aXD.
A. Interior's reliance on the environmental assessment
and regional coal leasing environmental impact statements
Appellants* claims on this issue involve Interior's interpretation of regulations governing the preparation of environmental impact analyses. Appellants contend that the
applicable regulations require Interior to produce a separate
environmental impact statement (MEISn) or to make a finding
of no significant impact with regard to the exchange. Appellants argue that Interior's reliance on an environmental
assessment relating to the exchange which incorporates prior
environmental impact statements on the impact of federal
regional coal leasing is statutorily inadequate. The district
court held that Interior complied with the environmental
impact regulations, Section 102(2XQ of the NEPA 4?

NORTHERN PLAINS V. LUMN

4947

U.S.C. section 4332(2Kc)f and that the exchange was proper.
675 F.Supp. at 1247-49. We affirm.
(I) As an initial matter we consider the applicable standard
of review. Contrary to appellants* contention that NEPA
issues are reviewed de novo, this court will only reverse a district court's finding that an environmental impact statement
is adequate if the district court's decision is based upon an
erroneous legal standard or upon clearly erroneousfindingsof
fact. Stop H-3 Association v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1460-62
(9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985). In turn,
the district court reviews the adequacy of the EIS under a rule
of reason: if the EIS contains a "reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental
consequences", a reviewing court may not "fly speck" an EIS
and hold it insufficient on the basis of inconsequential, technical deficiencies. Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484,492 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the EIS review
standard is limited and decidedly deferential to the agency's
expertise. NRDC v. Hodel 819 F.2d 927,929 (9th Cir. 1987).
And where the review involves the interpretation of a regulation, the agency's interpretation of its own regulation is to be
given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation. Marathon Oil Co. v. United
States, 807 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 107
S.Ct. 1593(1987).
The land and mineral interests covered by the exchange are
part of the Fort Union Coal Region. This Region is one of
twelve coal supply regions, and is one of the six such regions
containing significant amounts of federally owned coal. In
September 1981, BLM's Montana State Director issued the
Fort Union Coal Region Tract Summaries, which summarized the consequences of leasing and developing federally
owned coal in 24 tracts selected for further evaluation. Three
of these 24 tracts are the Circle West I, II, and III tracts, which
cover some but not all of the area involved in the instant Circle West exchange.
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After Meridian proposed the exchange in December 1981,
BLM's State Director issued a decision document in March
1982 announcing that the exchange warranted further consideration. In June 1982, BLM published its intent to pursue the
exchange and to complete an environmental assessment. Fed.
Reg. 24451, June 1982. In July 1982, BLM issued a comprehensive draft environmental impact statement on six alternative levels of coal leasing and development for the Fort Union
Coal Region ("Fort Union DEIS"), including a specific discussion of the Circle West exchange. In September 1982,
BLM issued an Air Quality Supplement, and in December
1982 BLM issued an environmental assessment (uEAn), to
which appellants submitted 41 pages of comments. In February 1983 BLM issued the Fort Union Final EIS, which incorporated by reference the DEIS and the Air Quality
Supplement.
In April 1983, BLM issued its "Decision Document/Lands
Report" concerning the exchange. The document summa-rized the previous, meetings, discussions and studies, andf
expressly concluded that the exchange conformed to the Redwater Management Framework Plan, the operative federal
land use plan. BLM signed the **Record of Decision" on April
26, 1983, and signed the exchange agreement on September
8, 1983. The agreement noted that the value of government
coal patented to Meridian was less than the value of the coal
deeded to the United States, and thus a cash equalization payment was due to Meridian under Sectioa 206(b) of the
FLPMA. Meridian waived such a payment a»d donated k as
a gift to the United States pursuant to Section 20S of the
FLPMA 41 U S C section 1715.
121 Interior analyzed the site-specific impacts ot the
exchange and the individual federal lease tracts in the Tract
Summaries and the EA, which were incorporated by reference into the Fort Union EIS. The cumulative impects of
these coal development actions on the Fort Union region and
the significant cumulative site-specific impacts were also dis-
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cussed in the EIS. The EA analyzing the exchange must be
read together with the Fort Union Regional draft and final
EIS reports, and all supporting documentation taken as a
whole. See Southern Oregon Citizens v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475,
1480 (9th Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1028 (1984).
Sine* the NEPA does not require a separate analysis of alternatives with consequences indistinguishable from the action
proposed, NRDC v. SEC 606 F.2d 1031, 1054 (D.C. Cir.
1979), Interior's discussion of coal development by leasing
also covers coal development by exchange. Indeed, we have
previously held that Interior must consider related coal
actions in a single EIS. Cody v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 795
(9th Cir. 1975); see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, All U.S. 390, 410
(1976). So long as the significant environmental impacts are
addressed in the EIS at issue, a separate EIS on the exchange
is not required. Columbia Basin Land Protection Association
v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 597 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover,
the NEPA does not require Interior to make site-specific analysis of the impacts of all possible development alternative^
Instead, the NEPA merely requires that Interior estimate tht
impacts of a likely or probable development alternative; it
need not prepare an EIS for speculative development alternatives, so long as it reserves the right to preclude or prevent
actions with unacceptable environmental consequences. See
Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988), cert,
denied sub. nom Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Lujan,
57 U.S.L.W. 3550, US LEXIS 828, 103 L.Ed.2d 184 (February 21, 1989); Conservation Law Foundation v. GSA. 707
F.2d 626, 634 (1st Cir. 1983).
The EIS at issue considered the impacts of two alternative
generic synthetic fuel plants. Since a federal coal lease creates
no entitlement to construct an on-site fuel plant, and such a
plant requires separate authorization under the FLPMA, 43
U.S.C actions 1761-71, Interior could lawfully defer a
detailed site-specific discussion of a proposed plant until a
later EIS. Sierra Club v. FERC 754 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (9th
Cir. 1985); Village of False Pass v. Clark. 733 F.2d 605, 615
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(9th Cir. 1984). This is exactly what the district court held
here. 675 F.Supp. at 1249. Moreover, since any fuel plant
would be subject to extensive state regulation, any
site-specific discussion of a proposed plant in the Interior's
EIS would, at this stage, be too speculative. See Enos v.
Marsh. 769 F.2d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985).
[31 The distnct court, atter considering the environmental
impacts assessed by the Tract Summaries, the EA, and the
h)it Union EIS, found that the agency was sufficiently
informed of the development alternatives and the reasonably
foreseeable significant environmental impacts that would
result as a consequence of the exchange. 675 F.Supp. at 1248.
The district court also found that since the specific impacts on
the full exchange acreage were the same as the impacts
addressed in the Tract Summaries incorporated into the EIS,
it was reasonable not to prepare another EIS summarizing the
same impacts on additional acreage. Id. We do not find tKat
the district court'applied an erroneous legal standard or ttfat
the court's holding was based upon clearly erroneous findings
of fact. Stop H-3 Association v. Dole. 740 F.2d 1442, 1460-62
(9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied. 471 U.S. 1108 (1985). Thus we
affirm the district court's finding that Interior complied with
the NEPA though it did not produce a separate EIS addressing only the Circle West exchange.
Appellants also claim that Interior violated three Council
on Environmental Quality regulations: 40 C.F.R. sections
1502.4, 1502.2, and 1508.13. However, these alleged regulatory violations are raised for the first time on appeal. Absent
exceptional circumstances, an issue not raised below will not
be considered on appeal. United States v. Oregon. 769 F.2d
1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985). No such circumstances are present here, especially given the limited scope of review of the
agency decision. Thus, these claims are barred.
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B. Interiors finding that the exchange complied with the
"equal value" requiremeni of Section 206(b) of the
FLPMA, 43 U.S.C section 1716(b).
Appellants raise three issues to challenge Interior's finding
that the exchange complied with the equal value requirement
of the FLPMA: (1) that Interior should have devalued the
coal conveyed to the United States by Meridian because of a
special wildlife protection provision applicable to federally
held lands; (2) that Interior did not consider the higher mining costs of the coal received by Interior, and (3) that Interior
did not adequately explain the government's one percent royalty interest on Meridian's coal. These arguments challenge
Interior's compliance with the statutory requirements of the
FLPMA and thus challenge the validity of the land patents
deeded to Meridian and received by the United States.
1. Appellants have not asserted a proper cause of action
(4] Appellants do not have either a cause of action or standing to challenge interior's grant of a land patent because
appellants do not and cannot assert any legal property interest in the land at issue. Appellants seek only to invalidate the
exchanged land titles. If a private cause of action does not
exist in favor of a particular plaintiff, the standing issue need
not even be addressed. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 45 3,
456f 465 n. 13 (1974); Raypath, Inc. v. City ofAnchorage. 544
F.2d 1019,1021 (9th Cir. 1976). It is well established federal
law that a plaintiff must establish his own entitlement to the
land before the validity of a land patent may be challenged.
See, e.g.. Fisher v. Rule. 248 U.S. 314, 318 (1919); St. Louis
Smelting and Refining Co. v. Kemp. 104 U.S. 636,647 (1881);
Donnelly v. United States. 850 F.2d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir.
1988), cert, denied. 109 S.Ct. 878 (1989); Lee v. United States,
809 F.2d 1406, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied. 108
S.Ct. 772 (1988); Raypath. Inc.. supra, 544 F.2d at 1021; Kate
v. United States. 489 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
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denied. 417 U.S. 915 (1974). We have succinctly stated who
is a proper party to challenge the validity of a land patent or
deed:
{T]he validity of a deed or patent from the federal
government may not be questioned in a suit brought
by a third party against the grantee or patentee, [citations omitted]. Simply stated, a plaintiff in such a
case has no cause of action. These holdings are supported by a sound reason. When public lands are
conveyed to private individuals, a contractual relationship is created between the Government and the
grantee; the integrity of such transactions could be
upset if a grantee, by its use of the land, became
monetarily liable to an amorphous class of third persons
Thus, even assuming that the grant to the
[patentee] was somehow invalid, or that the [patentee] violated the terms of the deed in some respect,
appellants are in no position to complain. They are
complete strangers to the title
Raypath. Inc.. 544 F.2d at 1021 [footnote omitted].
Absent the requisite property interest, appellants have no
private cause of action to challenge the grant of Meridian's
land patent through their equal value claims. The district
court did not expressly rule on this issue and decided the
claims on the merits. However, appellants* lack of a private
cause of action precludes their claim, and the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees
on these claims was proper on this ground alone.
2. Appellants lack standing to appeal the equal value
determination
[5] In addition, appellants do not have standing to challenge the equal value determination of Interior and thus neither the district court nor this court has jurisdiction to hear
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that issue. Although the district court ruled that plaintiffs-appellants did have standing and ruled on the merits of
their equal value claims, the standing issue is jurisdictional
and must be addressed before this court can reach the merits
of the claim. Fair v. Environmental Protection Agency, 795
F.2d 851,853 (9th Cir. 1986). Since the standing issue goes to
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is a matter of
law reviewable de novo. United States v. City of Twin Falls,
Idaho, 806 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 107
S.Ct. 3185(1987).
(61 The district court found that plaintiffs-appellants had
standing to sue, relying primarily on its decision in National
Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 677 FSupp 1445, 1453-56 (D.
Mont. 1985), appeal argued and submitted (February 1989)
(9th Cir. No. 87-4375). 675 F.Supp. at 1241. There, the district court held that plaintiffs who lived in impacted communities had standing to challenge allegedly underpriced coal
leases because fewer federal funds would be available under
the revenue sharing act to mitigate the adverse environmental and socioeconomic effects of the coal development. 677 F.
Supp. at 1455-56; 30 U.S.C. sections 191, 201(aX3XQ. It is
the environmental interest protected by 30 U.S.C. section 191
which confers standing to sue upon appellants.-Merely alleging injury to their status as taxpayers (i.e., fewer federal funds
from the coal development would result in higher taxes for
appellants) does not confer standing because it does not
create an interest in favor of appellants distinguishable from
that of the general public. Sheldon v. Griffin. 174 F.2d 382,
384 (9th Cir. 1949).
(7] To assert standing to sue, appellants must show with
reasonable precision the linkage between the challenged policy and the asserted injury. Wilderness Society v. Griles9 824
F.2d 4, 12:17 (D.C Cir. 1987). Mere conjecture demonstrating potential injury is not sufficient. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 494 (1974). Appellants have not alleged an injury
related to Interior's equal value determination; they merely
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state that Interior's decision might consequently cause the
revenue loss appellants envision once coal development
occurs. Appellants have failed to provide any declarations,
affidavits, or other evidence that the federal tract was worth
less after the exchange than it was before the exchange. Only
if the federal holdings decreased in value would the federal
revenue sharing funds be affected under 30 U.S.C section
191. In fact, Interior found that the federal tract increased in
value. Appellants put forward no evidence to contradict this
finding. Thus, appellants have not demonstrated the requisite
injury to assert standing, and their appeal on these claims
must be dismissed on these jurisdictional grounds as well.
C

Interior's interpretation that the exchange conformed
with the operative federal land use plan and did not
require BLM to amend the existing Redwater Management Framework Plan.

Appellants contend that the exchange does not conform
with the Redwater Management Framework Plan ("MFIf),
the operative federal land use plan. Appellants contend that
the MFP bars the exchange because that document only provides a land use plan for coal leasing, and does not expressly
provide for an exchange.
The applicable regulations are 43 C.F.R. sections 1601,
2200.1(a), and 2200.2(b). To conform with the public land
use plan, Ma resource management action shall be specifically
provided for in the plan, or if specifically mentioned, shall be
clearly consistent with the terms, conditions, and decisions of
the approved plan or plan amendment." 43 C.F.R.
1601.0-5(c). The exchange regulations provide that federal
lands may be exchanged where "disposal is in conformance
with the land use planning provisions contained in Subpart
1601.- 43 C.F.R. section 2200. t(aX 1984).
The MFP states that coal in the Circle West area could be
considered for leasing, that licenses to mine coal there could
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be issued, and that development could be allowed. The Decision Document/Lands Report relies on Decision 5.1 of the
Rcdwater MFP to support its conclusion that BLM was not
required to amend the existing MFP prior to the Circle West
exchange. This decision was concurred in by the BLM State
Director and by the Assistant Secretary of Interior in the September 1983 Decision Document on Protests.
The district court found BLM's interpretation of the MFP,
and Interior's subsequent determination that the exchange
conformed with the MFP, to be a reasonable interpretation of
its own regulations:
At the heart of the Circle West exchange is the facilitation of coal development, the United States possessing a unified area so as to promote coal leasing.
As stated in [Interior's] Decision Document/Lands
Report:
"Development" clearly indicates coal leasing and * provision for site development.
The coal exchange proposal is an alternative method to achieve both the lands and
minerals objectives reached in the [Redwater] plan.
In short, the Court cannot say that the Circle West
exchange is inconsistent or not otherwise in conformance with the REdwater [sic] MFP. The Interior's
reasonable interpretation that its own regulation
was satisfied is conclusive.
675 F.Supp. at 1247 (reference and citation omitted).
[8] This factual determination can only be overturned on
review if it is clearly erroneous. Vesey v. United States, 626
F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1986). An agency's interpretation of
its own regulations can only be overturned if "plainly
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erroneous" or clearly inconsistent with the regulation.
Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 765 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 1593 (1987). Appellants
have not met this heavy burden. The exchange action need
not be specifically mentioned, so long as it is clearly consistent with the plan. 43 CF.R. section 1601.0-5. Though appellants argue that the MFP was merely a preliminary decision,
the MFP was in fact afinaldecision that coal mining and leasing could occur. Finally, appellants mistakenly contend that
the exchange must conform to Section 206 of FLPMA. That
section requires only a public interest determination by Interior, and does not require Interior to issue a conforming land
use plan. 43 U.S.C. section 1716. Thus, since appellants have
not met their burden of demonstrating clear error by the district court, we affirm the district court's finding that Interior
reasonably interpreted the exchange to conform with the
existing MFP, and that no amendment to the existing MFP
was required prior to the exchange.
D. Summary
In sum, we find that the district court properly held that the
Circle West exchange complied with the National Environmental Policy Act requirements regarding adequate environmental impact analyses. As to the equal value claim,
appellants have no private cause of action to invalidate the
Circle West exchange because they cannot assert any fee
interest in the land at issue. Moreover, appellants lack standing to raise the equal value determination on the record presented on this appeal. Finally, the district court properly
upheld the Department of the Interior's determination that
the Circle West Exchange conformed with the existing land
use plan.
AFFIRMED.
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^mong other things, the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 1910
granted Arizona certain lands, excluding mineral lands, in trust for the
support of public schools, and, in 5 28, provided that granted lands cannot be sold or leased except upon compliance with certain conditions
regarding advertising, bidding, and appraisal Arizona incorporated
these conditions into Article 10 of its Constitution. After this Court
held the original mineral land exclusion inapplicable to lands not known
to be mineral at the time of the grant, Wyoming v United States, 255
U S 489, Congress passed the Jones Act in 1927, extending the terms
of the original grant to encompass all mineral lands The Enabling Act
was also amended in 1936 and 1951 to clarify the procedures for leasmg
granted lands for specific purposes The latter amendment expressly
extinguished the §28 restrictions on leases of granted lands for the
development of hydrocarbon substances Arizona's own law governing
mineral leases on state lands does not require that the lands be advertised, appraised, or leased for their full appraised value Ariz Rev
Stat Ann § 27-234(B) Respondents, individual taxpayers and a state
teachers association, brought a state-court suit against the State Land
Department and others, seeking a declaration that § 27-234CB) is void on
the ground that it does not comply with the provisions of § 28 or § 10 of
the Arizona Constitution and requesting appropriate injunctive relief
Petitioners, mineral lessees of state school lands, intervened as defendants The trial court upheld the statute The State Supreme Court reversed, ruling that § 27-234(B) is "unconstitutional and invalid as it pertains to nonhydrocarbon mineral leases," and remanded the case for the
trial court, vnter alia, to enter a judgment declaring § 27-234(B) invalid
and to consider what further relief might be appropriate
Held The judgment is affirmed
155 Ariz 484, 747 P 2d 1183, affirmed
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II-A, II-B-2, II-C, III, and IV, concluding that
1 This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision below
(a) The Arizona Supreme Court issued afinaljudgment within the
meaning of 28 U S C § 1257, despite the fact that it remanded the case
for the trial court to determine appropriate further relief On remand,
the trial court does not have before it any federal question whether past
or current leases are valid, since respondents, on appeal, withdrew their
request for an accounting and payment of sums due under past leases
In addition, the trial court's further actions cannot affect the State
Supreme Court's ruling that § 27-234(B) is invalid Thus, the judgment
below comes within two of the exceptions to thefinalityrequirement set
out in Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohen, 420 U S 469, 479, 480 (1) the
federal issue is conclusive and the outcome of further proceedmgs is preordained, and (2) the federal questions that could come to this Court
have been adjudicated by the state court, and the remaining issues will
not give rise to any further federal question.
(b) When a state court has issued a judgment interpreting federal
law m a case m which the plaintiffs in the original action lacked standing
to sue under the principles governing the federal courts, this Court may
exercise its jurisdiction on certiorari if the state-court judgment causes
direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for this
Court's review, as long as the requisites of an Article III case or controversy are also met Here, petitioners possess standing to mvoke
federal-court authority, since they have alleged that the decision below
poses a serious and immediate threat to their leases' continuing validity,
that such injury can be traced to the state court's erroneous interpretation of federal statutes, and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision in this Court Moreover, the requisites of a case or controversy are met, since the parties remain adverse, and the judgment below
altered tangible legal rights It would be inappropriate for this Court to
vacate the judgment below on the ground that respondents lacked federal standing when they brought suit initially, and to remand for appro-
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proceedings and have the effect of imposing federal standing requirements on the state courts whenever they adjudicate federal law issues,
whereas established traditions and this Court's decisions recognize that
state courts are not bound by Article III and yet have it within both
their power and proper role to render binding judgments on federal-law
issues, subject only to review by this Court It would also be inappropriate for this Court simply to order dismissal, leaving petitioners free to
bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court raising the same
claims, smce such a disposition would be likely to defeat the normal preclusive effects of the state court's judgment on the ground that that
court's conclusions about federal law were not subject to any federal review Such a course would also represent an unnecessary partial inroad
on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's construction of § 1257 as barring direct review m lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest
state court, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v Feldman, 460
U S 462, Hooker v Fidelity Trust Co , 263 U S 413, particularly smce
petitioners have already presented this Court with a case or controversy
justiciable under federal standards
(c) The decision below is not based on an adequate and mdependent
state ground that would defeat review of the federal issue by this Court
Although the state court's opinion mentioned the State Constitution several times and directed the trial court to declare § 27-234(B) "unconstitutional," its discussion focused solely on the federal statutes without ever
mentioning the State Constitution apart from the Enabling Act Moreover, the state court explicitly considered itself bound by this Court's decisions to adopt the plaintiffs' construction, and described Article 10 of
the State Constitution as simply a "rescript" of § 28 of the Enabhng Act
Thus, the opinion's references to the State Constitution merely reflect a
holding which rests on the state court's interpretation of federal law, and
do not divorce the state constitutional issue from the federal-law questions
2 Section 27-234(B) is invalid as to nonhydrocarbon mineral leases
smce the sale or lease of mineral lands granted to Arizona under the federal statutes must substantially conform to the mandatory requirements
set out m the Enabhng Act
(a) The grant of all lands under the Enabhng Act is conditioned, by
the statute's clear and express language, upon the specific requirements
for leasmg or selling those lands Petitioners' reliance on Neel v
Barker, 27 N M 605, 204 P 205, for the proposition that smce mineral
lands were originally exempt from the 1910 grant, the Enabhng Act's
provisions do not apply to lands later determined to be mineral in nature,
is flawed m two respects First, Neel did not take into account this
Court's decision in Wyoming v United States, supm, that unknown mineral lands were within the grant Second, smce those lands were within
the 1910 grant, they could not be regarded as unburdened by its mandatory conditions
(b) The lands granted under the Jones Act are also subject to the
Enabhng Act conditions To read that Act's § 1(a) language—which declares that the grant of mineral lands thereunder "shall be of the same
effect as prior grants" of nonmineral lands—as only assuring that title to
the lands passed and vested in the same manner and with the same validity as titles under the Enabhng Act would render the language redundant, smce the statute subsequently directly addresses the vestmg of titles Instead, that language achieved Congress' objective of extending
the 1910 grant to mineral lands and confirming their title to the States
Similarly, $ 1(b)—which states that though mineral lands may be sold,
the rights to mine and remove the minerals themselves may only be
leased "as the State legislature may direct"—is not blanket authority for
States to lease minerals on whatever terms they wish as long as the
leases' proceeds go to the schools Rather, it authorizes the States to
regulate the methods by which mineral leases are made and to specify
necessary or desirable additional terms, as long as the leases comply
with the Enabhng Act's dispositional requirements
(c) The 1936 and 1951 amendments to the Enabhng Act confirm that
Congress never removed the original conditions contained in the Act
In the amendments, Congress reiterated the formulation that lands
could be leased for certain purposes as the state legislature "may direct"
and as it "may prescribe " The 1936 Amendment did not alter the application of S 28 to "all lands," and the 1951 Amendment, because it expressly extinguished the 828 restrictions as to hydrocarbon leases, but
not as to other mineral leases, tends to confirm that the original restrictions remain m force as to nonhydrocarbon leases
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE STE-

VENS, and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded m Part II-B-1 that the suit would
have been dismissed at the outset if federal standing-to-sue rules were to
apply, since neither respondent taxpayers nor respondent teachers association, the original plaintiffs, would have satisfied the requirements for
bringing suit m federal court Respondent taxpayers' assertion that
M.nrt OOi/D\ L.— « J _ . . _ . . ^ J 4U~ „^1.^1 *,«. „* A.-.J- *f _ 11 ~„« »* J„ll«««
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thereby resulting in unnecessarily higher taxes," and respondent association's allegations that the section "imposes an adverse economic impact"
on its members and that teachers have a special interest in the quality of
education in the State, do not assert the kind of particular, direct, and
concrete personal injury that is necessary to confer standing to sue in
federal courts.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL,

and JUSTICE BLACKMUN, agreeing that the question whether the state
court plaintiffs had Article III standing is irrelevant when it is the defendants below who invoke the federal courts' authority, concluded that
it was unnecessary to reach the question of the standing of the plaintiffs
below.
KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Part I, in which all participating Members joined, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-A, II-R-2,
II-C, III, and IV, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN,
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II
Before we may undertake to consider whether the state
legislation authorizing the leases is valid under federal law,
we must rule on whether we have jurisdiction in the case.
The parties and amid raise three jurisdictional issues, each
of substance. We would be required, of course, to raise
these matters on our own initiative if necessary, for our legitimate exercise of judicial power is confined both by statutes and by Article III of the Constitution. The issues here
are: first, whether the judgment below is final; second,
whether there is standing and an actual case or controversy
that permits of a decision in federal court; and third, whether
the decision below is unreviewable in this Court because it
rests on an adequate and independent state ground.

and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-B-1, in

A
The first jurisdictional question is whether the Arizona
in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST,
Supreme Court issued a final judgment in the case. It
C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
granted plaintiffs a declaratory judgment that the state law
SCALIA, J., joined. O'CONNOR, J., took no part in the consideration or
governing mineral leases is invalid, but then remanded the
decision of the case.
case for the trial court to determine "just what further relief
is appropriate." 155 Ariz., at 498, 747 P. 2d, at 1197. The
Solicitor General of the United States, participating as amicus, asserts that the validity of existing leases remains at
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, exissue and that the trial court may yet decide to uphold the
cept as to Part II-B-1.
The ultimate question for our decision is whether Arizona's leases on the ground that they were made for "true value,"
statute governing mineral leases on state lands is void be- and thus are in "substantial conformity" with the provisions
cause it does not conform with the federal laws that originally of the Enabling Act, §28, 36 Stat. 574-575, even though the
granted those lands from the United States to Arizona. leasing procedures did not comply with every specific reFirst, however, there is a difficult question about our own ju- quirement in the Act. Brief for United States as Amicus
risdiction, a matter which touches on essential aspects of the Curiae 10-14 (hereafter Brief for United States).
If the assertion were correct, the judgment below would
proper relation between state and federal courts.
not yet befinalwithin the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257, and
we would lack jurisdiction in the case. But it is not correct.
I
Respondents originally sought a declaratory judgment that
Various individual taxpayers and the Arizona Education the state law is invalid, an injunction against further leases,
Association, which represents approximately 20,000 public and an accounting and payment of sums due under past
school teachers throughout the State, brought suit in Arizona leases; but they withdrew the last request on appeal to the
state court, seeking a declaration that the state statute gov- Arizona Supreme Court. See Brief for Appellant in No. CVerning mineral leases on state lands, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 86-0238-T, Kadish v. Arizona State Land Dept (Ariz. Sup.
§27-234(B) (Supp. 1988), is void, and also seeking appropri- Ct.), pp. 6, n. 3, 40. Thus, on remand the trial court does
ate injunctive relief. The state statute was challenged on not have before it any federal question of whether past and
the ground that it does not comply with the methods Con- current leases are valid because they were made in "substangress required the State to follow before it could lease or sell tial conformity" with the terms of the Enabling Act. And, of
the lands granted from the United States in the New Mexico- course, the trial court's further actions cannot affect the AriArizona Enabling Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 557, and which are re- zona Supreme Court's ruling that § 27-234(B) is invalid. Acpeated in the Arizona Constitution. The suit was brought cordingly, the judgment below comes within two of the exagainst the Arizona Land Department and others. ceptions to the finality requirement that were set out in Cox
ASARCO and other current mineral lessees of state school Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975). Here
lands were permitted to intervene as defendants. Eventu- "the federal issue is conclusive" and "the outcome of further
ally the trial court certified the case as a defendant class ac- proceedings preordained." Id., at 479; see also Duquesne
tion under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The defend(1989). In addition,
ant class consisted of all present and future mineral lessees of Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U. S.
the "federal questions that could come here have been adstate lands.
The trial court upheld the statute on cross-motions for judicated by the State court/" and the remaining issues, consummary judgment, and respondents (the original plaintiffs) trary to the Solicitor General's suggestion, will not give rise
appealed. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed over the to any further federal question. Cox, supra, at 480, quoting
dissent of one justice, ruling that the statute is "unconstitu- Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 127
tional and invalid as it pertains to nonhydrocarbon mineral (1945).
B
leases." Kadish v. Arizona State Land Dept., 155 Ariz. 484,
498, 747 P. 2d 1183,1197 (1987). It remanded the case to the
The second jurisdictional issue is of some theoretical imtrial court with instructions to enter summary judgment for port, though infrequent in occurrence. The question is
respondents, to enter a judgment declaring §27-234(B) whether, under federal standards, the case was nonjusticiinvalid, and to consider what further relief, if any, might be able at its outset because the original plaintiffs lacked standappropriate.
ing to sue; and if so, whether we may examine justiciability at
Various of the mineral lesseesfileda petition for certiorari, this stage because the Arizona courts heard the case and proand we granted review. 488 U. S.
(1988).
ceeded to judgment, a judgment! which causes concrete injury

which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS and SCAUA, JJ., joined.

BREN-

NAN, J.,filedan opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
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The same flaw defeats the claim that the teachers association would have had standing to bring this suit originally in
federal court. The association and its members contend that
1
the state law "imposes an adverse economic impact" on them.
The Solicitor General contends that the case should be dis- Complaint, HIV. Yet even if invalidation of the state law
ssed for lack of standing, since neither respondent taxpay- would create increased revenue for the school trust funds in
s nor respondent teachers association, who were the origi- the near future, an issue much disputed here, the allegations
1 plaintiffs, would have satisfied the requirements for of economic harm rest on the same hypothetical assumptions
inging suit in federal court at the outset. "In essence the as do the taxpayer claims. If respondents prevailed and inestion of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have
creased revenues from state leases were available, maybe
B court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular is- taxes would be reduced, or maybe the State would reduce
es." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). Alsupport from other sources so that the money available for
DUgh standing in its outer dimensions is a prudential conschools would be unchanged. Even if the State were to dept to be shaped by the decisions of the courts as a matter of vote more money to schools, it does not follow that there
and judicial policy and subject to the control of Congress,
would be an increase in teacher salaries or benefits. These
its core it becomes a constitutional question; for standing policy decisions might be made in different ways by the govits most basic aspect can be one of the controlling elements
erning officials, depending on their perceptions of wise state
the definition of a case or controversy under Article III.
fiscal policy and myriad other circumstances. Whether the
*e Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for association's claims of economic injury would be redressed by
paration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471-476 a favorable decision in this case depends on the unfettered
382); id., at 490-494 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The
choices made by independent actors not before the courts and
aiding of respondents if they hadfiledsuit in federal court whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts
the trial level may be resolved by applying well-settled
cannot presume either to control or to predict. We have
inciples of federal law.
much less confidence in concluding that relief is likely to follow from a favorable decision here than we had in cases like
The question whether taxpayers or citizens have a suffiAllen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984), and Simon v. Eastern
snt personal stake to challenge laws of general application
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976),
lere their own injury is not distinct from that suffered in
where standing was found to be lacking because the probable
neral by other taxpayers or citizens covers old and familiar
response of private individuals to explicit tax incentives was
ound. As an ordinary matter, suits premised on federal
xpayer status are not cognizable in the federal courts be- judged to be too uncertain to satisfy the redressability prong
of federal standing requirements.
use a taxpayer's "interest in the moneys of the treasury
. is shared with millions of others, is comparatively minute
Petitioners also argue that the "likelihood" of a redressable
id indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of
injury is increased once it is recognized that the claims of the
ly payments out of the funds, so remote,fluctuatingand un- taxpayers and the teachers association rest upon independent
rtain, that no basis is afforded for [judicial intervention]." contingencies. The implication is that the Court should curothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 487 (1923) (decided mulate the probabilities, in the event that plaintiffs prevail,
ith Massachusetts v. Mellon).
of either the taxpayers receiving direct relief from the inWe have indicated that the same conclusion may not hold creased revenues or the teachers receiving indirect economic
r municipal taxpayers, if it has been shown that the "pecu- benefit from higher funding for schools. Reply Brief for Peir relation of the corporate taxpayer to the [municipal] cor- titioners 14-15. This line of reasoning evokes two re>ration" makes the taxpayer's interest in the application of sponses. First, it does not avoid the fundamental problem
unicipal revenues "direct and immediate." Frothingham, that the courts are unable to evaluate with any assurance the
ipra, at 486-487, citing Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S.
"likelihood" that decisions will be made a certain way by poli)l, 609 (1880). Yet we have likened state taxpayers to fedcymaking officials acting within their broad and legitimate
•al taxpayers, and thus we have refused to confer standing
discretion. Second, the doctrine of standing to sue is not a
>on a state taxpayer absent a showing of "direct injury," pe- kind of gaming device that can be surmounted merely by agtniary or otherwise. Doremus v. Bd. of Education of
gregating the allegations of different kinds of plaintiffs, each
awthorne, 342 U. S. 429, 434 (1952).
of whom may have claims that are remote or speculative
No such showing has been made in this case, and respondtaken by themselves. Instead, the basic inquiry, for each
lt taxpayers do not allege any special circumstances or exparty seeking to invoke the authority of the federal courts,
ptions that would confer standing upon them. Instead,
Warth, 422 U. S., at 498-499, is whether that party alleges
iey have simply asserted that the Arizona statute governing personal mjury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conineral leases has "deprived the school trust funds of millions
duct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Val' dollars thereby resulting in unnecessarily higher taxes." ley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472.
omplaint, Kill. Even if the first part of that assertion
When the allegations of economic injury are put to one
ere correct, however, it is pure speculation whether the
side, the claims made by both the taxpayers and the teachers
wsuit would result in any actual tax relief for respondents,
association reduce to something like the association's contenthey were to prevail, it is conceivable that more money
tion that the state law undermines "the quality of education
ight be devoted to education; but since education in Arizona in Arizona." Complaint, 1 IV. We cannot say with any cernotfinancedsolely from the school trust fund, Tr. of Oral
tainty that this contention is even likely to be correct. The
rg. 8-10, the State might reduce its supplement from the
claims raised here, moreover, are the kind of generalized
meral funds to provide for other programs. The possibility
grievances brought by concerned citizens that we have conlat taxpayers will receive any direct pecuniary relief from sistently held are not cognizable in the federal courts. See
ds lawsuit is "remote,fluctuatingand uncertain," as stated Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 111-112 (1983); Valley
Frothingham, supra, and consequently the claimed injury Forge, supra, at 482-487; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
not "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Vcti727, 736-740 (1972); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists
y Forge, supra, at 472.
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974); United States
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v. ftiehardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974).
Our precedents demonstrate that a party may establish
standing by raising claims of noneconomic injury, see, e. g.,
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91
(1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S.
205 (1972), but claims of injury that are purely abstract, even
if they might be understood to lead to "the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct
with which one disagrees," Valley Forge, supra, at 486, do
not provide the kind of particular, direct, and concrete injury
that is necessary to confer standing to sue in the federal
courts. Although the members of the teachers association
might argue that they have a special interest in the quality of
education in Arizona, such a special interest does not alone
confer federal standing. Cf. Sierra Club, supra, at 739-740.
The argument does not succeed in distinguishing the members in this regard from students, their parents, or various
other citizens.
Our review discloses no basis on which to find that respondents would satisfy the requirements for federal standing articulated by our precedents. It follows that the suit
would have been dismissed at the outset were the federal
rule to apply.
2
But the state judiciary here chose a different path, as was
their right, and took no account of federal standing rules in
letting the case go to final judgment in the Arizona courts.
That result properly follows from the allocation of authority
in the federal system. We have recognized often that the
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of
a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability
even when they address issues of federal law, as when they
are called upon to interpret the Constitution or, in this case, a
federal statute. See, e. g., Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U. S. 1,
8 (1988); Lyons, supra, at 113; Doremus, 342 U. S., at 434;
Secretary of State of Md. v. J. H. Munson Co., 467 U. S.
947, 971 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring); Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U. S. 1302, 1305 (1976) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers); cf. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U. S.
608, 612 (1937).
Although the state courts are not bound to adhere to federal standing requirements, they possess the authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render
binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations of federal law. See 28 U. S. C. § 1738; Grubb v. Public
Utilities Commn. of Ohio, 281 U. S. 470 (1930). Indeed, inferior federal courts are not required to exist under Article
III, and the Supremacy Clause explicitly states that "the
Judges in every State shall be bound" by federal law. U. S.
Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
The question now arises whether a judgment rendered by
the state courts in these circumstances can support jurisdiction in this Court to review the case. At this juncture, petitioners allege a specific injury stemmingfromthe state-court
decree, a decree which rests on principles of federal law.
Petitioners insist that, as a result of the state-court judgment, the case has taken on such definite shape that they are
under a defined and specific legal obligation, one which
causes them direct injury.
We agree. Although respondents would not have had
standing to commence suit in federal court based on the allegations in the complaint, they are not the party attempting to
invoke the federal judicial power. Instead it is petitioners,
the defendants in the case and the losing parties below, who
bring the case here and thus seek entry to the federal courts
for thefirsttime in the lawsuit. We determine that petition-
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ers have standing to invoke the authority of a federal court
and that this dispute now presents a justiciable case or controversy for resolution here.
Petitioners hold mineral leases that were granted under
the state law the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated. Although no accounting of sums due under these leases remains
at issue in this particular case, it is undisputed that the decision to be reviewed poses a serious and immediate threat to
the continuing validity of those leases by virtue of its holding
that they were granted under improper procedures and an
invahd law. The state proceedings ended in a declaratory
judgment adverse to petitioners, an adjudication of legal
rights which constitutes the kind of injury cognizable in this
Court on review from the state courts. See, e. g., Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 261-265
(1933). Petitioners are faced with "actual or threatened injury" that is sufficiently "distinct and palpable" to support
their standing to invoke the authority of a federal court.
Warth, 422 U. S., at 500, 501.
Petitioners contend before us that the Arizona Supreme
Court's decision rests on an erroneous interpretation of federal statutes. They claim that the declaratory judgment
sought and secured by respondents, along with the relief that
may flow from that ruling, is invalid under federal law. If
we were to agree with petitioners, our reversal of the decision below would remove its disabling effects upon them. In
these circumstances, we conclude that petitioners meet each
prong of the constitutional standing requirements. As the
parties first invoking the authority of the federal courts, they
have shown that they "personally ha[ve] suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the [other party]. . . and that the injury 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision.'" Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472
(citations omitted). In addition, petitioners' standing to invoke the authority of this Court is not affected by any of the
prudential limitations that have been identified in prior cases.
Id., at 474-475. Indeed, the Solicitor General appears to recognize the force of these points. See Brief for United States
20, n. 14 ("in light of the decision below, [petitioners] may
now have standing" to invoke the authority of a federal
court).
We also conclude that "the record shows the existence of a
genuine case or controversy essential to the exercise of the
jurisdiction of this Court." Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S.
44, 46 (1943). These parties remain adverse, and "valuable
legal rights . . . will be directly affected to a specific and substantial degree by the decision of the question of law." Wallace, 288 U. S., at 262. We are not confronted, certainly,
with parties "attempting to secure an abstract determination
by the Court of the validity of a statute . . . or a decision advising what the law would be on an uncertain or hypothetical
state of facts," ibid., as might be the case, for example, if petitioners were seeking review of an advisory opinion rendered through specific mechanisms for obtaining a hypothetical ruling from a state court or other state official. The
proceedings here were judicial in nature, and resulted in a
final judgment altering tangible legal rights. This proceeding constitutes a cognizable case or controversy. Cf. In re
Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 568-569 (1945).
Although petitioners satisfy the requirements of federal
standing and present an actual case or controversy for decision here, the Solicitor General contends this showing is insufficient to support our jurisdiction. He suggests that the
appropriate order is dismissal, and that petitioners are then
free "to bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court"
raisins: these same claims. Brief for United States 20. n. 14.
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etitioners counter that if the Court finds it cannot review
le judgment on the merits, the proper course is to vacate
le judgment below and remand for appropriate further prosedings, Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-15, as we have done at least on
)me occasions when a case becomes moot while it is pending
n review from a state court. See, e. g.t DeFunis v.
degaard, 416 U. S. 312, 320 (1974). Neither disposition is
ppropriate here.
If we were to vacate the judgment below on the ground
lat respondents lacked federal standing when they brought
nit initially, that disposition would render nugatory the enre proceedings in the state courts. The clear effect would
e to impose federal standing requirements on the state
ourts whenever they adjudicate issues of federal law, if
iiose judgments are to be conclusive on the parties. That
esult, however, would be contrary to established traditions
nd to our prior decisions recognizing that the state courts
re not bound by Article III and yet have it within both their
ower and their proper role to render binding judgments on
jsues of federal law, subject only to review by this Court.
In addition, we doubt it would be a proper exercise of our
uthority to vacate the state court's judgment in these cirumstances. It would be an unacceptable paradox to exerise jurisdiction to confirm that we lack it and then to interere with a State's sovereign power by vacating a judgment
endered within its own proper authority. This case is not
ne committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
ourts. We have no authority to grant a writ only to anlounce that, solely because we may not review a case, the
tate court lacked power to decide it in the first instance.1
If we were merely to dismiss this case and leave the judglent below undisturbed, a different set of problems would
nsue. Although the judgment of a state court on issues of
>dera! law normally binds the parties in any future suit even
'that suit is brought separately in federal court, we have ocasionally cautioned that such a judgment may well not bind
he parties if the state court's conclusions about federal law
rere not subject to any federal review. See, e. g.f
)vremus, 342 U. S., at 434 ("we cannot accept . . . as the
asis for conclusive disposition of an issue of federal law withut review, any procedure which does not constitute" a case
r controversy); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S.
51, 557 (1940) (this Court is responsible for assuring "that
tate courts will not be the final arbiters of important issues
inder the federal constitution"); Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust
:o. of Kansas City v. Swope, 27A U. S. 123, 130-131 (1927)
1
The Court's treatment of cases that become moot on review from the
>wer federal courts, as distinct from those that become moot on review
*om state courts, is illuminating on this point. In the former situation,
be settled disposition of a case that has become entirely moot is for this
tourt to "vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to disiiss.w United States v. MunMngwear, Inc., 840 U. S. 36,39 (1950). The
ower to make that disposition is predicated on our "supervisory power
ver the judgments of the lower federal courts," which "is a broad one."
d., at 40. In the latter situation, on review of state judgments, the same
isposition is not made. Traditionally, where the entire case had become
noot, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded for such furher proceedings as the state court might deem appropriate, as in DeFunis
'. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), since the state courts, not bound by
Lrticle III, were free to dispose of the case in a variety of ways, including
einstatement of the judgment. More recently, however, the regular
practice in the latter situation has been to dismiss the case and leave the
udgment of the state court undisturbed, which evinces a proper recogniion that in the absence of any live case or controversy, we lack jurisdiction
nd thus also the power to disturb the state court's judgment. See, e. g.t
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Commn. of Kan,, 481 U. S. 1044
1987); Times-Picayune Bub. Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 420 U. S. 986
1975).

5-30-89

(proceeding in state court is res adjudicata if "the constitutional rights asserted, or which might have been asserted in
that proceeding, could eventually have been reviewed here").
The predominant interest promoted by this apparent exception to normal preclusion doctrines is to assure that the binding application of federal law is uniform and ultimately subject to control by this Court. See Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U. S. 24, 42, n. 13 (1974) (this Court may review a declaratory judgment granted by a state court, for "any other
conclusion would unnecessarily permit a state court of last resort, quite contrary to the intention of Congress in enacting
28 U. S. C. § 1257, to invalidate state legislation on federal
constitutional grounds without any possibility of state officials who were adversely affected by the decision seeking review in this Court'*).
Given the likelihood that dismissal in this case would defeat
the normal preclusive effects of the state court's judgment,
however, the effect again would be to impose federal standing requirements on a state court that sought to render a
binding decision on issues of federal law. It also would denigrate the authority of the state courts by creating a peculiar
anomaly in the normal channels of appellate review. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine interprets 28 U. S. C. § 1257 as ordinarily barring direct review in the lower federal courts of a
decision reached by the highest state court, for such authority is vested solely in this Court. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983); Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281,
296 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413,
415-416 (1923). The Solicitor General urges that the proper
course for petitioners is to sue in federal trial court in order
to readjudicate the very same issues that were determined in
the state-court proceedings below. Brief for United States
20, n. 14. That action, in essence, would be an attempt to
obtain direct review of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision
in the lower federal courts, and would represent a partial inroad on Rooker-Feldman's construction of 28 U. S. C. §1257.
For these reasons, we believe it would be inappropriate to
dismiss the case at this stage.2 That disposition would come
at the cost of much disrespect to state-court proceedings and
judgments. It also would require petitioners to commence a
new action in federal court to vindicate their rights under
federal law, even though right now they present us with a
case or controversy that is justiciable under federal standards. Cf. Wallace, 288 U. S., at 262-263 (a justiciable controversy is not "any the less so because through a modified
procedure appellant has been permitted to present it in the
state courts''). Instead, we adopt the following rationale for
'None of the precedents cited by the parties, and none that we have
found, is squarely on point. In J. H. Munson, the original defendant
brought an appeal to defend the constitutionality of a state statute declared
unconstitutional by the state court, but the Court began by evaluating the
standing of the original plaintiffs, as we do here, and found that they did
meet the requirements for federal standing, which obviated any further inquiry. 467 U. S., at 954-959. The same is not true in this case. In Revert v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.t 463 U. S. 239 (1983), the Court found
that the original plaintiff met the requirements imposed by Article III, and
then refused to invoke the prudential limitation ofjus tertii, at least in part
so as to avoid any question of "leaving intact the state court's judgment in
favor of [the original plaintiff], the purportedly improper representative of
the third party's constitutional rights." Id., at 243. In Doremus v. Bd. of
Education of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), an appeal brought from
state court by a losing taxpayer plaintiff was dismissed, because in that
instance the party seeking to invoke the authority of the federal courts was
found to lack standing, as would be true of the taxpayer plaintiffs in this
case as well. Id., at 432-435. Yet here respondents are the injured parties who seek to invoke the authority of this Court, and they meet the federal standing requirements.
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out decision on this jurisdictional point: When a state court
has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in the original action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on
certiorari if the judgment of the state court causes direct,
specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for
our review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are
also met.
We are not unmindful of the paradox that would result if
respondents (plaintiffs below) prevail on the merits, for then
they will have succeeded in obtaining a federal determination
here that was unavailable if the action had been filed initially
in federal court. Nonetheless, although federal standing
"often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted/'
it "in no way depends on the merits of the [claim]." Wartk,
422 U. S., at 500. The rule we adopt is necessary in deference to the States and in response to the petitioning parties
who seek this forum to redress a real and current injury
stemming from the application of federal law.
We therefore conclude that we may properly decide this
case. Petitioners meet the requirements for federal standing under Valley Forge. Because they are the parties first
invoking the authority of the federal courts in this case, and
an actual case or controversy is before the Court, there is no
jurisdictional bar to review. In these circumstances, and
having already granted review, we believe the proper course
is not to dismiss the case or to vacate the judgment below,
but to undertake review of the federal issues on their merits.

C
The last threshold procedural issue concerns the possibility
that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground that would defeat review of the federal issues by this Court. See, e. g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,
296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). Here the state court mentioned
the state constitution several times in its opinion but otherwise relied exclusively on federal law, including an extended
discussion of the applicable federal statutes and their legislative histories. 155 Ariz., at 486-487, 747 P. 2d, at
1185-1196. In its conclusion, however, the Arizona
Supreme Court directed the trial court "to enter a judgment
declaring A. R. S. § 27-234 unconstitutional and invalid as it
pertains to nonhydrocarbon mineral leases." Id., at 498, 747
P. 2d, at 1197.
We conclude that the opinion below is not based on an adequate and independent state ground. Its discussion focuses
solely on the federal statutes, and the state constitution is
never mentioned on its own apart from the Enabling Act.
The Arizona Supreme Court explicitly considered itself
"bound to adopt the construction advanced by [plaintiffs]"
based on the prior decisions of this Court, and described Article 10 of the Arizona Constitution as simply a "rescript" of
§28 of the Enabling Act. Id., at 495-496, 747 P. 2d, at
1194-1195. In light of this description, the references to the
Arizona Constitution simply reflect a holding which rests on
the state court's interpretation of federal law. Although the
Arizona Supreme Court was free to rest its holding on the
state constitution as an independent ground, the decision
below did not divorce the state constitutional issue from the
questions of federal law. See Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v.
Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 164 (1917); see also 155 Ariz., at
495, 747 P. 2d, at 1194 ("The Enabling Act is the 'fundamental and paramount law* in Arizona," quoting Murphy v.
State, 65 Ariz. 338, 345, 181 P. 2d 336, 340 (1947)).
In sum, we do not lack jurisdiction to review the decision
below.
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Ill
The issue on the merits is whether Arizona may lease mineral lands granted from the United States without meeting
the specific requirements imposed by federal statute. We
begin with a more detailed review of the statutes in question.
In 1910, Congress passed the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 557, which authorized the people of those
territories to form state governments. Among its other provisions, the Enabling Act granted Arizona certain lands
within every township for the support of public schools.
Congress provided, however, that the new State would hold
those granted lands in trust and subject to the specific conditions set out in § 28 of the Act, 36 Stat. 574-575. Under the
conditions, the granted lands could not be sold or leased except to the highest bidder at a public auction following notice
by advertisements in two newspapers weekly for 10 weeks.
Leases for a term of five years or less were exemptfromthe
advertising requirement. Lands could not be sold or leased
for less than the values set by an appraisal required by the
statute. All proceeds derived from the lands would go to a
permanent segregated fund, and interest, but not principal,
was to be spent for support of public schools. Arizona incorporated those restrictions in its proposed constitution, Ariz.
Const., Art. 10, and was admitted to the Union in 1912.
The grant of lands in the Enabling Act specifically excluded mineral lands, §§6, 24, 36 Stat. 561-562, 572, but this
gave rise to uncertainty about what are known as "unknown"
mineral lands, those lands on which minerals were not discovered until after the grant. In two subsequent decisions, this
Court held that the exclusion applied only to lands known to
be mineral at the time of the grant, and that unknown mineral lands were granted under the Act. Wyoming v. United
States, 255 U. S. 489, 500-501 (1921); United States v. Sweet,
245 U. S. 563, 572-573 (1918). These holdings in turn
spawned numerous disputes over whether lands were known
to be mineral at the time they were grantedfromthe Federal
Government. See, e. g., Work v. Braffet, 276 U. S. 560,
561-563 (1928). Title to lands in many western States was in
doubt, and the issue became more difficult to prove as the
years passed. Accordingly, in 1927 Congress passed the
Jones Act, 44 Stat. 1026, a brief statute that extended the
terms of the original grant of lands in the western States to
encompass mineral lands as well. Congress also has
amended the Enabling Act twice, each time to clarify the procedures for leasing granted lands for specific purposes. See
Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 517, 49 Stat. 1477; Act of June 2,
1951, 65 Stat. 51.
Arizona's own law governing the leasing of state mineral
lands, enacted in 1941, requires every such lease to ''provide
for payment to the state by the lessee of a royalty of five per
cent of the net value of the minerals produced from the
claim." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §27-234(B) (Supp. 1988).
But it does not require those lands to be advertised or appraised before they are leased, and does not require the lands
to be leased at their full appraised value. The lands in question here were granted to Arizona either in 1910, by the
terms of the Enabling Act itself, or in 1927, under the Jones
Act.
The grant of all lands under the Enabling Act is conditioned, by the statute's clear language, upon the specified requirements for leasing or selling those lands. The Act declares that uall lands hereby granted . . . shall be by the said
State held in trust, to be disposed of in whole or in part only
in the manner as herein provided, . . . and that the natural
products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall be
subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same."
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lands "by the State as the State legislature may direct," with
i 28,36 Stat. 674, 675 (emphasis added). "Disposition of any
"the proceeds of rentals and royalties therefrom to be utilized
of said lands, or of any money or thing of value directly or
for
the support or in aid of the common or public schools."
indirectly derived therefrom,... in any manner contrary to
44
Stat.
1026-1027. According to petitioners, therefore, the
the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust."
.
Jones
Act
did not impose the same restrictions on mineral
Any such disposition is expressly stated to be "null and void"
lands as did the Enabling Act; on the contrary, it explicitly
unless "made in substantial conformity with the provisions of
repudiated any such restrictions on the newly granted lands.
this Act." Ibid. And, again, the requirements set forth in
We do not agree with this reading of the Jones Act. First,
the Act apply to "[a]ll lands, leaseholds, timber, and other
the suggested interpretation of the "same effect" language
products of land." Ibid.
would render that language redundant: the statute continues
Petitioner cites Neel v. Barker, 27 N. M. 605, 204 P. 205
immediately with an additional clause that directly addresses
(1922), as standing for the proposition that because mineral
the "vest[ing]" of "titles to such numbered mineral sections."
lands originally were exempted by Congress from the grant
§ 1(a), 44 Stat. 1026. Instead, we believe that the "same efmade in the Enabling Act, its provisions for the sale or lease
fect" language has independent meaning, and that it achieved
of granted lands did not apply to those lands later determined
Congress' stated objective of "extending]" the 1910 grants to
encompass all mineral lands and of "[confirming" title to such
to be mineral in nature. That proposition, never tested in a
lands in the States. 44 Stat. 1026.
federal court, isflawedin two respects. First, in Wyoming
Second, the language of § Kb) does not undermine the conv. United States, supra, decided the year before but not menclusion that § 1(a) of the Jones Act extended the coverage of
tioned or discussed in Neel, this Court held that unknown
the Enabling Act's express restrictions as well as of its grant
mineral lands were within thegrant made by Congress. Secof lands. Section 1(b) says that though the mineral lands
ond, since those lands were granted to the States under the
may be sold, the rights to mine and remove the minerals
authority of the Enabling Act itself, they could not be rethemselves
are reserved to the State and may only be leased.
garded as unburdened by its mandatory conditions. In conSuch
leases
may be undertaken "as the State legislature may
sequence, the New Mexico Supreme Court erred in concluddirect." Petitioners would read § Kb) as containing the sole
ing that because "Congress did not intend to grant to the
dispositional restrictions on the newly granted lands, and
state any mineral lands . . . it follows that the state is not
would read the latter passage as a blanket authority for the
controlled nor restricted by said act in regard to leasing said
States to lease minerals on whatever terms they wish to set,
lands for mineral purposes." 27 N. M., at 611, 204 P., at
as long as the proceeds of those leases go to the schools.
207. All the lands granted under the Act are granted subThis interpretation suffers from several defects. To begin
ject to its conditions.1
with, it does not offer a comprehensive understanding of the
The lands granted under the Jones Act are subject to the
statutory regime. Section 1(b) contains no dispositional resame conditions. This very brief enactment was passed to
strictions on the sale or lease of the newly granted lands exaddress the continuing problems associated with the dual recept for the provision that the mineral rights on those lands
gime, under which the adjudication of title to lands would deare reserved to the State. If the "same effect" language in
pend on whether they were known to be mineral at the time
§ 1(a) does not extend the dispositional restrictions in the Enthe Federal Government granted them. H. R. Rep.
abling Act to the lands granted in the Jones Act, then those
No. 1761, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1927); S. Rep. No. 603,
lands are subject to no dispositional restrictions at all, though
69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-6 (1926). Indeed, its formal title
their mineral rights would be reserved. This is inconsistent
was: "An Act Confirming in States and Territories title to
with the view that the lands granted under the Jones Act are
lands granted by the United States in the aid of common or
part of the school trust. Similarly, if the "as the State legispublic schools." 44 Stat. 1026. The Jones Act resolved the
lature may direct" language is the blanket authority for
problem of the dual regime by simply "extend[ing]" the prior
which petitioners contend, it would allow minerals to be
grants of lands "to embrace numbered school sections mineral
leased for little or no royalty, and thus would leave room for
in character." 51, 44 Stat. 1026. The statute explicitly
all the abuses that the establishment of a school trust was destated that "the grant of numbered mineral sections under
signed to prevent.
this Act shall be of the same effect as prior grants for the
Perhaps the most fundamental defect of the interpretation
numbered non-mineral sections." § 1(a), 44 Stat. 1026 (em- urged by petitioners is that it would largely perpetuate the
phasis added).
dual regime that Congress sought to eliminate by enacting
Petitioners make two points about the proper reading of
the Jones Act. Under that interpretation, the restrictions in
this statute. First, they argue that the "same effect" lanthe Enabling Act would continue to apply to unknown minguage was intended only to assure that the title to these
eral lands, but would not apply to known mineral lands. As
lands passed and vested in the same manner and with the
a result, for example, some of the leases involved in this case
same validity as did the title to lands granted under the Enmight be proper, under the Jones Act, while others would be
abling Act, but said nothing about the conditions upon which
improper, under the Enabling Act, and the critical difference
those lands were granted. Second, they argue that the lanwould rest on a determination, to be made at some future
guage of § 1(b) of the Jones Act granted the States a broad point, whether those lands were known to be mineral in 1910.
authority to lease the mineral deposits in the newly granted
This is surely not the resolution Congress intended when it
passed this statute, and it is neither a sensible nor an appeal'One possible distinction between mineral leases and the lease of lands
ing
one.4
for other purposes is that mineral rights can be difficult to appraise, which
might make the Enabling Act's provisions less helpful m this setting. But
this Court recognized long ago that such rights are subject to valuation in
condemnation proceedings, and that whatever the difficulties may be in
making such appraisals with complete accuracy, it does not defeat the existence of a "market value" m mineral rights, and it does not suffice as a
reason to depart from the ordinary requirements that the law imposes on
roch transactions. Montana R. Co. v. Warren, 187 U. S. 848, 852-853

AUnder the reading of the Jones Act we adopt, there may still be traces
of the dual regime, though they are minimized. For example, it might be
argued that "the right to prospect for, mine, and remove" minerals on unknown mineral lands can be sold, whereas those same rights on known mineral lands cannot, since the Jones Act's prohibition m this regard is limited
to those lands in "the additional grant made by this Act" 91(b), 44 Stat.
1026. We need not decide m this case, however, whether that reading of
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In addition, the "as the State legislature may direct" language is not inconsistent with the express restrictions set
forth in the Enabling Act. Given the preceding restrictions
on the sale of minerals in § 1(b), Congress may have thought
it necessary to emphasize that leases were subject to no such
novel limitations; instead, the States retained all the authority given under the conditional grants made in the Enabling
Act. We thus agree with the court below that this language
is properly viewed as authorizing the States to regulate the
methods by which mineral leases are made and to specify any
additional terms in those leases that are thought necessary or
desirable, as long as the leases comply with the dispositional
requirements set forth in the Enabling Act. See 155 Ariz.,
at 491,747 P. 2d, at 1190. But this language, in and of itself,
does not dispense with those restrictions.1
Both sides place a great deal of emphasis on the later
amendments to the Enabling Act, which occurred in 1936 and
1951. We think that the language of the original grants of
these lands to Arizona is the decisive basis for decision here,
and that subsequent amendments are at best only illustrative
of how a later Congress read the original terms of the statute. Congress could not, for instance, grant lands to a State
on certain specific conditions and then later, after the conditions had been met and the lands vested, succeed in upsetting
settled expectations through a belated effort to render those
conditions more onerous. Congress could relax the conditions upon which lands had been granted previously, of
course, but we see nothing in the later amendments here to
suggest that it has done so. Instead, the later amendments
are wholly consistent with the view that Congress granted
these lands in 1910 and 1927 subject to the conditions discussed previously, and has never removed those conditions.6
In both the 1936 and the 1951 amendments, Congress reiterated the formulation that the lands could be leased for certain purposes as the state legislature "may direct," Act of
June 5, 1936, ch. 517, 49 Stat. 1477, and as it "may prescribe," Act of June 2, 1951, 65 Stat. 52. But the former
amendment did not alter the application of §28 to "[a]ll lands
. . . and other products of land," which remained in a passage
which directly followed the "as the State legislature may direct" language. And the latter amendment altered the
application of § 28 in a maimer that tends to confirm the interpretation adopted here: it expressly extinguished the advertising, bidding, and appraisal restrictions upon any leases
of these lands "for the exploration, development, and production of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon substances," 65 Stat.
52, though not upon leases for other purposes, such as mineral leases. Thus the subsequent history of these statutes,
•In the wake of the enactment of the Jones Act in 1927, the experience
of New Mexico is instructive as a contemporaneous reading of the statute.
Concerned that the Act had undermined whatever basis there might have
been for the decision in Neel v. Barker, 27 N. M. 606, 204 P. 205 (1922),
the New Mexico government immediately petitioned Congress to authorize
a state plebiscite to codify its holding as law. In response, Congress
passed a joint resolution to that effect. Joint Resolution No. 7, ch. 28, 45
Stat 58. The language of the resolution explicitly permitted New Mexico
to waive the advertising, appraisal, and bidding requirements on all mineral leases. This explicit language was conspicuously absent from the
Jones Act itself
'The decision in Lassen v. Arizona Highway Dept, 885 U. S. 458
(1967), has no bearing on the issues raised in this case. In Lassen, the
Court held that Arizona was not obliged to follow the Enabling Act's specific requirements when it condemned land for use in its highway program,
teeing "no need to read the Act to impose these restrictions on transfers in
which the abuses they were intended to prevent are not likely to occur, and
in which the trust may in another and more effective fashion be assured full
compensation.n Id., at 464. Unlike public condemnation proceedings,
however, the private sales and leases at issue here are precisely the kinds
of transactions addressed by the federal statutes. Ibid.
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to the extent it indicates anything of significance, merely confirms that the original restrictions upon the sale or lease of
mineral lands contained in the Enabling Act and the Jones
Act remain undiminished in force.
IV
"The Court's concern for the integrity of the conditions imposed by the [Enabling Act] has long been evident." Alamo
Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U. S. 295, 302 (1976).
We conclude that the sale or lease of mineral lands granted to
the State of Arizona under these federal statutes must substantially conform to the mandatory requirements set out in
the Enabling Act. The court below was correct in declaring
Ariz. Rev, Stat. Ann. §27-234(B) (Supp. 1988) invalid as to
nonhydrocarbon mineral leases. The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR

took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE
MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part

and concurring in the judgment.
I join all but Part II-B-1 of the Court's opinion. I disagree both with the view expressed in JUSTICE KENNEDY'S
opinion that the plaintiffs below, particularly the Arizona
Education Association, had no standing, and also with the decision to reach that issue. The Court holds in Part II-B-2
that the question whether the state-court plaintiffs had Article III standing is irrelevant when it is the defendants below
who now invoke the authority of the federal courts. The discussion of the standing question in Part II-B-1 is therefore
unnecessary.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA
joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Part I of the Court's opinion and I also agree with
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S conclusion in Part II-B-1 that respondents, plaintiffs below, have failed to show the sort of "injury
in fact" necessary to satisfy Article III standing requirements. Ante, at 4-8. This requirement 'tends to assure
that the legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in
the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of
the consequences of judicial action." Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982). For me, absence of
standing disposes of this case and requires dismissal of the
appeal. Doremus v. Board of Education of Hawtlwrne, 342
U. S. 429 (1952).
In Doremus, we dismissed an appeal from state court by
taxpayers because they lacked standing. The Court now
says that although the Doremus case is good law for plaintiffs
who lack standing but lost in the state court on the merits of
their federal claim, it is not good law for such plaintiffs who
prevailed on the merits of their federal question in the state
courts. The fact that such a rule has a very one-sided application does not necessarily mean it is wrong, but it should at
least require a very persuasive justification—a more persuasive one than the Court provides in its opinion.
The Court justifies the result it reaches by saying that the
state court judgment adverse to petitioners is itself a form of
"injury" which supplies Article III standing. The difficulty
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with thfiC explanation is that petitioners—mineral lessees and
defendants in the courts below—have always been able to
show that a judgment adverse to their position would "injure" them in a very real sense. The defect in the state
court proceedings, so far as Article III standing is concerned,
was not that the proceedings did not threaten to injure the
petitioners, but that the operation and enforcement of the
challenged statute did not injure plaintiffs-respondents.
The subsequent proceedings in the state court have obviously
not cured this defect.
One could, of course, analogize the proceedings on certiorari in this Court to the commencement of what might be
called the federal phase of the law suit, and say that for such
purpose the petitioner is like the plaintiff filing a suit in the
federal district court: therefore it is the petitioner's standing,
not that of the respondents which should concern us at this
stage of the litigation. Certainly some of our mootness cases
following United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36
[1950) indicate that where a judgment entered in a lower federal court no longer has a present effect on the parties, we
mil not only not review the case but we will direct the
vacation of the judgment of the lower courts. But while a
present effect of the judgment on the parties may be a necessary condition for continuing federal jurisdiction, I do not
relieve that it is inevitably a sufficient condition.
The Court's opinion makes much of the fact that "the
•ecord shows the existence of a genuine case or controversy,"
mte, at 10, and that these parties remain adverse. . . ."
foid. But most of our case law limiting federal standing does
lot depend on any conclusion that the parties were not "adverse" or that there was no "genuine case or controversy" in
Jie lay sense of those terms. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
190 (1975); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, supra; DeFunis
r. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard
0.y 410 U. S. 614 (1973). In each of these cases the parties
vere emphatically adverse to one another, and vigorously
intended with one another as to how the lawsuit should be
lecided. No one suggested that the cases were trumped-up,
»r that they were "friendly suits." The shortcoming iiTeach
»f them was the failure of the plaintiffs to establish actual inury to themselves as a result of the governmental action
rhich they sought to challenge on federal grounds. To have
onsidered their cases on the merits would have required us
NOTICE: These opinions are subject to formal revision before publication
in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers arc requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
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to decide the questions presented "in the rarified atmosphere
of a debating society"; the plaintiffs had simply a generalized
grievance about governmental action which they claim is prohibited by federal statute or by the United States Constitution. And that is really all that the Court has before it in the
present case.
The Court is concerned with the fact that if it applies
Doremus as sauce for the goose as well as for the gander
state courts will remain free to decide important questions of
federal statutory and constitutional law without the possibility of review in this Court. This is true, but I think it a
rather unremarkable proposition. Some state courts render
advisory decisions on federal law of no binding force even
within the State. See, e. g., Mass. Const., Art. LXXXV
(amending the Massachusetts Constitution to provide that:
"Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or
the council, shall have authority to require the opinions of the
justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions"); Mich. Const., Art.
3, § 8 ("Either house of the legislature or the governor may
request the opinion of the supreme court on important questions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality
of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its
effective date"). In each instance, the interpretation of federal law may affect the governance of the State and thereby
make some people better off and some worse off. Yet none
of these decisions of federal law are reviewable in this or any
other federal court. I see no reason to fear that our dismissal of the present appeal would lead to a legal landscape in
which we would no longer have the opportunity to review
many important decisions on questions of federal law.
Therefore I see no reason why this Court should bend its
Article III jurisprudence out of shape to avoid a largely imaginary problem.
DANIEL M. GRIBBON, Washington, D.C. (WILLIAM H. ALLEN, ELIZABETH V. FOOTE, DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS, COVINGTON & BURLING, BURTON M. APKER, APKER, APKER
& KURTZ P.C., HOWARD A. TWITTY, and TWITTY, SIEVWRIGHT & MILLS, on the briefs) for petitioners; DAVID S. BARON,
Tucson, Ariz. (KEVIN J. LANIGAN, on the briefs) for respondents;
CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT, Assistant to the Solicitor General
(CHARLES FRIED, Sol. Gen., ROGER J. MARZULLA, Asst.
Any. Gen., LAWRENCE G. WALLACE, Dpty. Sol. Gen., ROBERT
T. KLARQUIST, and J. CAROL WILLIAMS, Justice Dept. attys.,
on the briefs) for U.S., as amicus curiae.

NOTE: Where it is deemed desirable, a syllabus (headnote) will be
released * * * at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no
part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of
Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit
Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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Robert J. DeBRY, Plaintiff,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
APPEALS, Defendant
No. 870004-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 8, 1988.
Appeal was taken from order of the
County Board of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that in the absence of statute specifically creating right
to judicial review, Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction.
Petition for review dismissed.
1. Courts *»248
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and the district court's appellate jurisdiction must be provided by statute. Const.
Art 8, § 5.
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
*»663, 681
Statute giving the Court of Appeals
appellate jurisdiction over final orders and
decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them defines the outermost limit of the
Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction and
allows it to review agency decisions only
when the legislature expressly authorizes a
right of review. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(a).

William F. Bannon (argued), Robert J.
DeBry, Robert J. DeBry & Associates, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff.
David E. Yocom, Paul Maughan (argued), Salt Lake Co. Atty.'s Office, Salt
Lake City, for defendant.
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and
JACKSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
JACKSON, Judge:
Robert J. DeBry ("DeBry") filed a petition in this court seeking direct appellate
review of a final order of the Salt Lake
County Board of Appeals ("Board"). We
dismiss for lack of iuriadictLoiL
[1] DeBry proceeds from the premise
that a direct "appeal" to some court of this
state from a final order of a local governmental agency is an inherent right However, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the district court's appellate jurisdiction must be provided by statute.
Utah Const, art VIII, § 5. Because there
is no constitutional or other statutory provision creating a right to judicial reviewin either court—of final orders of local
administratove agencies such as the
Board,1 DeBry contends our general jurisdictional statute must be interpreted as the
statutory grant of a right of direct "appeal" to this court We do not agree.

3. Administrative Law and Procedure
*»663
In the absence of specific statute creating right to judicial review of order of
county board of appeals, Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a8(2Xa).

[2,3] At the time DeBry's petition was
filed, that statute provided: "The Court of
Appeals lias appellate jurisdiction . . . over:
(a) the final orders and decrees of state and
local agencies or appeals from the district
court review of them
" Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2Xa) (1987).* This general

1. Cf. Utah Const art. Vm, § 5 ("Except for
matters filed originally with the supreme court
there shall be in all cases an appeal of right
from the court of original jurisdiction to a court
with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.").

(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction ... over.
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings
of the agencies ...;
(b) appeals from the district court review of
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of poiiti-

2. The statute was recently amended by 1988
Utah Laws, ch. 73, § 1 (effective April 25, 1988).
It now reads, in pertinent part
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statute defines the outermost limits of our
appellate jurisdiction, allowing us to review
agency decisions only when the legislature
expressly authorizes a right of review.
See State ex reL Dep't of Human Servs. v.
Manfre, 102 N.M. 241, 693 P.2d 1273, 1275
(Ct.App.1984). It is not a catchall provision
authorizing us to review the orders of every administrative agency for which there
is no statute specifically creating a right to
judicial review. In the absence of such a
specific statute, we have no jurisdiction.3
DeBry's petition is therefore dismissed.
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ.,
concur.
(p
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Peter K. DEMENTAS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
The ESTATE OF Jack TALLAS, By and
Through FIRST SECURITY BANK,
Personal Representative, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860351-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 17, 1988.
Claim was filed against decedent's estate to recover on written agreement to
make claimant an heir. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J.,
held for estate, and appeal was taken. The
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that
agreement was not enforceable contract in
cal subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1988).
3. Our determination that this court has no jurisdiction in this case does not leave parties without a remedy for arbitrary or unlawful local
agency action where there is no statute specifically authorizing judicial review. See, e,g., Utah
R.Civ.P. 65B(b)(2); Davis County v. Clearfield

that it constituted promise for past services
performed gratuitously.
Affirmed.

1. Executors and Administrators e»227(l,
2)
Claim asserted against estate, reciting
that estate was in debt to claimant for
$50,000, based upon services rendered and
acknowledgment by deceased, to which was
attached a memorandum by deceased promising to pay money to claimant, gave sufficient notice to estate of claimant's "account
stated" claim, as well as his claim premised
on quantum meruit theory; personal representative had all information it needed to
investigate claim and decide whether to pay
it, and it was inconsequential that claim did
not articulate particular legal theory upon
which payment of claim would most appropriately be premised. U.C.A.1953, 75-1102(1), (2Kb), 75-3-804(lXa, b).
2. Evidence 0=419(11)
Extrinsic evidence was admissible to
prove whether there was consideration for
promise, even if parties had reduced their
agreement to writing which appeared to be
completely integrated agreement
3. Contracts ^»61
Any detriment no matter how economically inadequate will constitute sufficient
consideration to support personal service
contract
4. Contracts *»79
Written agreement to make claimant
an heir in light of his past services to
testator did not give rise to personal services contract enforceable by claimant against
testator's estate where promise to pay was
for past services performed gratuitously.
City, 756 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah App.1988) (where
there is no specific, statutorily prescribed method for judicial review of city council action,
review is available by "traditional means" of
extraordinary writ). See also Whiting v. Clayton, 617 P.2d 362 (Utah 1980); Peatross v. Board
of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281
(Utah 1976).

